The post-1987 options skew was primarily an American rather than global phenomenon

Evidence

It is, for example, noteworthy that the skew in index options appears initially to have been largely an American phenomenon. L9 The British options market, for example, does not seem to have responded to 1987 by developing a similar skew (Gemmill 1996). Although stock markets in the United Kingdom and elsewhere also crashed, the effects on the then-tiny British derivatives markets were nowhere near as devastating as in the United States. When a consistent skew did emerge in the U.K. in the first half of the 1990s, it seems to have been only a third as intense as in the U.S. In Japan, too, the skew may have been less marked (Gemmill and Kamiyama 2001). — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera, 921

Categorization

• XREF: Supports the institutional-sociology reading of performativity: the crash reshaped US derivatives markets deeply but left smaller UK/Japanese markets relatively untouched. — connects to: The post-1987 volatility skew became a permanent feature of index options — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial…, 901; Post-1987 German options skew ran opposite to the U.S. skew — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial…, 1590; The 1987 crash traumatized U.S. derivatives markets in ways absent elsewhere. — Donald MacKenzie & Yuval Millo, Constructing a Market, Performing Theory, 165

Broader Connections

• Post-1987 German options skew ran opposite to the U.S. skew #corroborates (0.92) — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera, 1590
• The 1987 crash traumatized U.S. derivatives markets in ways absent elsewhere. #corroborates (0.85) — Donald MacKenzie & Yuval Millo, Constructing a Market, Performing Theory, 165