The other is an aesthetic constituent, not a moral obligation.

Evidence

Segalen’s crucial idea was that encountering the Other superactivates poetic imagination and understanding. Of course, from that moment on there could be no question of hierarchy in pursuit of relations with the other. Let me point out, however, that Segalen do es not merely describe recognition of the other as a moral obligation (which would be a banality) but he considers it an aesthetic constituent, the first edict of a real poetics of Relation. The power to experience the shock of elsewhere is what distinguishes the poet. — Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 213

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The Other’s essential character is objectivity, not embodied life.; Sympathy is not intrinsically moral because it serves partiality, not impartiality. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 660; Norms shaped by kin altruism and group solidarity are not necessarily moral norms. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 693 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Norms shaped by kin altruism and group solidarity are not necessarily moral norms. #expands (0.82) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 693
• Sympathy is not intrinsically moral because it serves partiality, not impartiality. #corroborates (0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 660
• The Other’s essential character is objectivity, not embodied life. #corroborates (0.75)