The Other’s presence is a brute fact irreducibly distinct from the for-itself’s own facticity.

Evidence

There is no doubt that my belonging to an inhabited world has the value of a fact. It refers to the original fact of the Other’s presence in the world, a fact which, as we have seen, can not be deduced from the ontological structure of the for-itself. And although this fact only makes our facticity more deep-rooted, it does not evolve from our facticity in so far as the latter expresses the necessity of the contingency of the for-itself. Rather we must say: the for-itself exists in fact; that is, its existence can not be identical with a reality engendered in conformity to a law, nor can it be identical with a free choice. And among the factual characteristics of this “facticity”—i.e., among those which can neither be deduced nor proven but which simply “let themselves be seen”—there is one of these which we call the existence-in-the-world-in-the-presence-of-others. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1210

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Distinguishes facticity (the contingent givenness of the for-itself) from the separate, non-deducible fact of the Other’s presence.
  • XREF: This distinction between facticity and the presence of others is foundational for Beauvoir’s account of the Other in The Second Sex and the ethics chapter of The Ethics of Ambiguity. — connects to: The Other’s character is his facticity, given only to be surpassed; The for-itself is simultaneously nihilation and, via the Other, a thing — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1046; The situation is things plus myself, not impressions, revealing brute facticity. (+3 more)

Broader Connections