The Other’s objectivity is a real qualification I confer, not a refraction

Evidence

But the same people who uphold this thesis affirm on the other hand that I derive the concept of the Other from myself by reflecting on my own powers and by projection or analogy. Therefore they remain at the center of a vicious circle from which they can not get out. Actually the Other can not be the meaning of my objectivity; he is the concrete, transcending condition of it. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 756 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Thus for me the Other is first the being for whom I am an object; that is, the being through whom I gain my objectness. If I am to be able to conceive of even one of my properties in the objective mode, then the Other is already given. He is given not as a being of my universe but as a pure subject. Thus this pure subject which by definition I am unable to know—i.e., to posit as object—is always there out of reach and without distance whenever I try to grasp myself as object. In experiencing the look, in experiencing myself as an unrevealed object-ness, I experience the inapprehensible subjectivity of the Other directly and with my being. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 747 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: The Other’s essential character is objectivity, not embodied life.; The Other grounds my objectivity rather than being inferred by analogy from myself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 756; The Other is the being through whom I can attain any objective self-knowledge — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 747 (+2 more)

Broader Connections