The Other’s necessity is contingent facticity, like the cogito’s indubitability

Evidence

And if this fact still appears to us in the form of a necessity, yet it does not belong with those “conditions of the possibility of our experience” or—if you prefer—with ontological necessity. If the Other’s existence is a necessity, it is a “contingent necessity;” that is, it is of the same type as the factual necessity which is imposed on the cogito. If the Other is to be capable of being given to us, it is by means of a direct apprehension which leaves to the encounter its character as facticity, just as the cogito itself leaves all its facticity to my own thought, a facticity which nevertheless shares in the apodicity of the cogito itself—i.e., in its indubitability. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 707

Categorization

• DEFINE: Introduces ‘contingent necessity’ — the Other is indubitable (apodictic) yet factual rather than ontologically necessary — a key term for the systematic backdrop.
• QUESTION: How does Sartre reconcile apodicity with facticity here — is this a stable distinction or does it collapse under scrutiny?
• XREF: connects to: The Other’s existence is a contingent but unprovable necessity.; The Other’s existence is certain while the Other’s identity as this object never is.

Broader Connections

• The Other’s existence is a contingent but unprovable necessity. #corroborates (0.85)
• The Other’s existence is certain while the Other’s identity as this object never is. #expands (0.82)