The Other’s existence is a contingent but unprovable necessity.

Evidence

But the other negation is the reason for the appearance of the new one; for if there is an Other who puts me out of play by positing my transcendence as purely contemplated, this is because I wrench myself away from the Other by assuming my limit. The consciousness (of) this wrenching away of the consciousness of (being) the same in relation to the Other is the consciousness (of) my free spontaneity. By this very wrenching away which puts the Other in possession of my limit, I am already putting the Other out of play. Therefore in so far as I am conscious (of) myself as of one of my free possibilities and in so far as I project myself toward myself in order to realize this selfness, to that extent I am responsible for the existence of the Other. It is I who by the very affirmation of my free spontaneity cause there to be an Other and not simply an infinite reference of consciousness to itself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 781 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Neither my own existence nor the Other’s can be proved, only factually necessitated.; The for-itself’s free spontaneity makes the Other’s existence possible — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 781; The existence of Others is a contingent primary event, not derivable from the for-itself (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• The existence of Others is a contingent primary event, not derivable from the for-itself #expands (0.88)
• The for-itself’s free spontaneity makes the Other’s existence possible #expands (0.82) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 781
• The Other’s existence is disclosed, not abstractly proven #corroborates (0.80)
• Certainty of the Other’s existence arises from the cogito itself, not from inference #expands (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 710