The Other’s essential character is objectivity, not embodied life.

Evidence

Under the rubric of acquaintance, one knows of the other only what he is toward the outside, either in the purely social-representative sjense, or in the sense of that which he shows us. The degree of knowledge covered by “being well acquainted with one another,” refers not to the other per se; not to what is essential in him, intrinsically, but only to what is significant for that aspect of him which is turned toward others and the world. — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 7794 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Now we have seen that absence is a structure of being-there. To be absent is to-be-elsewhere-in-my-world; it is to be already given for me. As soon as I receive a letter from my cousin in Africa, his being-elsewhere is concretely given to me by the very indications of this letter, and this being-elsewhere is a being-somewhere; it is already his body. We can in no other way explain why a mere letter from a beloved woman sensually affects her lover; all the body of the beloved is present as an absence in these lines and on this paper. But since the being-elsewhere is a being-there in relation to a concrete ensemble of instrumental-things in a concrete situation, it is already facticity and contingency. It is not only the encounter which I had yesterday with Pierre which defines his contingency and mine; his absence yesterday similarly defined our contingencies and our facticities. And this facticity of the absent is implicitly given in these instrumental-things which indicate it; his abrupt appearance does not add anything. Thus the Other’s body is his facticity as an instrument and as a synthesis of sense organs as it is revealed to my facticity. It is given to me as soon as the Other exists for me in the world; the presence or absence of the Other changes nothing. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 894 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Husserl’s Other is a constitutive category, not a real being; The Other’s objectivity is a real qualification I confer, not a refraction; The Other’s body is given as his facticity regardless of presence or absence. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 894 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• The Other’s objectivity is a real qualification I confer, not a refraction #expands (0.85)
• Acquaintance reveals only the other’s outward-facing self, not their essence #corroborates (0.80) — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 7794
• The Other’s body is given as his facticity regardless of presence or absence. #qualifies (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 894