The norm of instrumental optimality can only derive its pull from non-optimizing considerations.

Evidence

A fundamental metaethical proposition can be glimpsed here. As Samuel Scheffl er has explained, a normative standard of instrumental optimality for individuals— which attaches no special signifi cance to the viewpoint, actions, or other features of the agent herself— must derive its attraction, paradoxically, from ā€œconsiderations other than instrumental optimality.ā€ The contrary notion that instrumental optimality has primary normative signifi cance faces insuperable complications. For instance, as argued later in this book, there may be circumstances in which the deliberate attempt to optimize may not be the most sure route to optimization. Knowing when and how to depart from the optimization calculus in favor of more pragmatically sensible approaches therefore implies the existence of some in de pen dent agent responding to at least some additional normative criteria. — Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere, 117

Categorization

  • recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
  • XREF: connects to: Being an ethical agent requires supplying non-externally-dictated reasons for acting. — Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental…, 120; Optimal action under ideal assumptions can be useless under real conditions — Brian Christian, The Alignment Problem, 1033; Even ideal Pareto optimality smuggles in contested normative baselines rather than objectivity. — Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental…, 276 (+1 more)

Broader Connections