The mind should be studied by its activities, not as a substance

Evidence

Besides claiming to transform the way we think about reality, phenomenologists promised to change how we think about ourselves. They believed that we should not try to find out what the human mind is, as if it were some kind of substance. Instead, we should consider what it does, and how it grasps its experiences. — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 151

Categorization

• DEFINE: Captures the functional rather than substantial conception of mind that distinguishes phenomenology from Cartesian introspective psychology.
• XREF: This functional view of mind is the pivot on which Sartre’s being-for-itself (no fixed essence) turns later in the book. — connects to: The mind is defined by its aboutness rather than by any fixed substance — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 154; Social cognitive theory treats mind as embodied cerebral process, not immaterial substance. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 304; A mind that is about nothing is not really a mind — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 154 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• The mind is defined by its aboutness rather than by any fixed substance #corroborates (0.92) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 154
• Social cognitive theory treats mind as embodied cerebral process, not immaterial substance. #corroborates (0.82) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 304
• Intentionality means the mind’s constant aboutness, not deliberate purpose #corroborates (0.80) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 152
• A mind that is about nothing is not really a mind #expands (0.75) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 154
• Power should be studied at its effects, not its intentions #expands (0.72) — Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 46