Social cognitive theory treats mind as embodied cerebral process, not immaterial substance.
Evidence
Social cognitive theory adopts a physicalistic conception of human agency (Bandura, 2008). In this view, the mind is considered the embodiment of higher-level cerebral processes rather than a disembodied immaterial entity. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 304
Categorization
- DEFINE: Defines the physicalistic ontology required before Bandura can claim humans are genuine causes without dualism.
- corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 304
- XREF: connects to: Process philosophy claims mind and nature share one substance of events — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 480; The mind should be studied by its activities, not as a substance — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 151