The judge’s reputation value is itself a check against bribery and extortion.
Evidence
One need not look far in history (or, for that matter, in the modern world) to see that judges are not always so perfect. Within our model, there are many small amendments that could be made to insert opportunities for bribery and extortion. Although we do not provide a systematic treatment of these, we shall give a brief development of one of them to emphasize the simple idea that the Law Merchant business is itself valuable and that LMs may wish to maintain their reputation for honesty and diligence in order to keep the business active. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 140
Categorization
- SEED: A reputation-based theory of judicial integrity: the judge’s business value is the enforcement mechanism keeping the judge honest — a nice essay angle on institutional self-policing.
- XREF: connects to: Formal judges strengthen reputation systems rather than replace them. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 14; Institutional and legal constraints give people strong external incentives to be trustworthy
Related
- Formal judges strengthen reputation systems rather than replace them. (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Formal judges strengthen reputation systems rather than replace them.
#expands(0.78) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 14 - Institutional and legal constraints give people strong external incentives to be trustworthy
#expands(0.72)