The Iraq War’s failure forced a rhetorical shift from unilateral coercion to counterinsurgency

Evidence

The war on Iraq, however, did not go the way the neocons wanted it to. Instead of greeting US forces as liberators, the Iraqi people resisted and rejected US hegemony. The plan to carry out regime change in Iran and Syria was halted; if anything, Iran was strengthened by US actions. Not only was the neocon vision of a new Middle East in jeopardy, but the United States had alienated its former allies in Europe and strengthened China (as well as Russia and Venezuela). All of this led retired General William Odom to call the Iraq War “the greatest strategic disaster in US history.” This prompted an about-face in the Bush administration’s policies, which moved toward the use of more multilateral tactics. Additionally, the administration moved away from “hard” power (such as the use of coercion and bribery) and toward winning “hearts and minds,” as represented in the counterinsurgency strategy championed by its military commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus. — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, 489

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to existing vault claims about Islamophobia as imperial policy — the shift from overt war to softer ‘hearts and minds’ counterinsurgency is a crucial periodization for how empire recalibrated its public rationale. — connects to: The Iraq War’s failure forced Bush to abandon regime-change plans and adopt counterinsurgency; Iraqi resistance forced US strategy from conquest to counterinsurgency hearts-and-minds tactics; A crucial rhetorical shift produces a new political narrative — Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 134 (+1 more)

Broader Connections