The hardest enforcement problem is deterring judge bribery.

Evidence

Theorem 4 pertains to a model in which only one kind of dishonest behavior by the LM is possible. The problem of discouraging other kinds of dishonest behavior may require other strategies. From our preliminary analysis, it appears that the most difficult problem is to deter the LM from soliciting or accepting bribes from traders who have an unpaid judgment but wish to conceal that fact. By concealing the judgment, cheating. and refusing to pay the new judgment, the trader could “earn” Q - Q and a portion of that might be offered as a bribe to the LM. As we add richness to the possibilities for cheating, it is natural to expect that the necessary institutions and strategies must respond in a correspondingly rich way. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 161

Categorization

• XREF: The corrupt-judge problem maps onto the Godfather reading: Bonasera’s recourse to Corleone presupposes a judge who stays bought or at least un-bribable-against, and a Don whose own discretion must somehow be disciplined.