The for-itself’s freedom renders all possibles as nothings, forever hollowed from within

Evidence

In addition my possibilities do not exist but are possibilized because they are eaten away from within by my freedom; that is, whatever my possible may be, its opposite is equally possible. I can shatter this inkwell but I can just as well put it in a drawer. I can aim at the full moon beyond the crescent moon, but I can just as well insist on the permanence of the crescent as such. Consequently the inkwell is found to be provided with equivalent possibilities: to be put in a drawer, to be shattered. This crescent moon can be an open curve in the sky or a disk held in suspense. Those potentialities which refer back to the this without being made to be by it and without having to be—those we shall call probabilities to indicate that they exist in the mode of being of the in-itself. We cannot say that my possibles are; they are possibilized. But probabilities are not “probabilized,” they are each one in itself as probable. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 612

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Sartre’s distinction between ‘possibles’ (possibilized by the for-itself) and ‘probabilities’ (in-itself potentialities) is a core ontological distinction foundational to the system.
  • XREF: This possibles-vs-probabilities distinction sets up Beauvoir’s account of how the for-itself relates to its situation and future — the systematic backdrop requested. — connects to: The For-itself derives all its powers precisely from not being Being; The for-itself is only the emptiness where the in-itself detaches — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 576; Freedom is synonymous with the for-itself’s lack of being — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1328 (+4 more)

Broader Connections