The excess of time on time may itself be something other than time.

Evidence

If time is ‘the being which, in being, is not and in non-being, is’, then this also means, rigorously put: ‘Time itself is not what it is.’ Time is not always (simultaneously, successively, and permanently) the same as itself. The concept of time has its own moments: it differentiates itself and thus temporalizes itself. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 254 (#expands, via linked claim)

The Hegelian analysis of time is not aimed at the single ‘now’; nor does time appear in it as ‘that in which’ becoming has its place. Hegel clarifies this: ‘It is not in time that everything comes to be and passes away, rather time itself is the becoming.’ Derrida comments: ‘Hegel took multiple precautions of this type. By opposing them to all the metaphorical formulations that state the “fall” into time, … one could exhibit an entire Hegelian critique of intratemporality (Innerzeitigkeit).’ — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 257 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
• XREF: connects to: Time is not identical to itself but differentiates and temporalizes itself — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 254; Time is not the container of becoming but is itself the becoming — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 257; Time is plastic because it differentiates itself both synchronically and diachronically (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Time is not identical to itself but differentiates and temporalizes itself #expands (0.90) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 254
• Time is not the container of becoming but is itself the becoming #expands (0.80) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 257
• Time is plastic because it differentiates itself both synchronically and diachronically #expands (0.75)
• Neither ancient nor modern notions of time adequately capture time’s twofold negation #qualifies (0.72) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 118