The Egyptian army resembled pre-nationalist European mercenary armies held together by pay and force.

Evidence

In that sense Ibrahim was faced with the usual problems confronting a commander of any of the European armies that preceded the rise of the modern nation-state: a mercenary officer corps that was on the “job market” seeking employment in the expanding armies of this or that prince or king and a disgruntled peasantry which had been conscripted by force but which had not yet been fooled into thinking that it was their own interest that they were fighting for. Force and lucrative pay were the only way to keep such armies intact. It follows that too little pay might push the officers to defect and seek another career opportunity elsewhere, and too much force in imposing discipline might incite the soldiers to open rebellion. — Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha_s Men_ Mehmed Ali, his…, 1333

Categorization

Category: Causal Relationships

  • XREF: Resonates with the law-merchant/mercenary institutional analysis in the reader’s Milgrom and ‘Opting out of the Legal System’ highlights about reputation and wage incentives.