The Constitution’s own structure refutes treating religion as mere speech

Evidence

One could spill a lot of ink explaining why it is absurd to suppose that religion is not religion after all, but just speech from a religious point of view. But fine arguments are not necessary in this case because the Constitution itself supposes that religion is a category of activity distinct from speech. Why else would the First Amendment take the trouble to guarantee the freedom of religion and then turn around and add a separate and distinct guarantee of the freedom of speech? Indeed, the obvious fact that religion is a distinct activity is essential to make sense of the Establishment Clause, the very first clause of our First Amendment. Congress is proscribed from the “establishment of religion”—a concept easily grasped—but it isn’t proscribed from the “establishment of speech,” because the latter is nonsensical. What, after all, is the justification for religion’s substantial and unique tax benefits if religion is nothing more than a form of speech like any other? — Katherine Stewart, The Power Worshippers, 860

Categorization

• QUESTION: This internal-consistency rebuttal is powerful — worth verifying whether constitutional scholars accept this framing.
• SEED: The lexical slip ‘from speech’ vs. ‘of speech’ — religion as a distinct constitutional category — could anchor an essay on how category-erasure enables constitutional evisceration.
• XREF: connects to: Religious establishment was legally redefined as private individual speech — Katherine Stewart, The Power Worshippers: Inside the…, 839; Religious claims serve different functions depending on political position — Nadim N. Rouhana and Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, When Politics Are Sacralized:…, 207

Broader Connections

• Religious claims serve different functions depending on political position #qualifies (0.72) — Nadim N. Rouhana and Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, When Politics Are Sacralized, 207