The army, not the pieds noirs, drove events for six months from late 1960.

Evidence

Among the élite formations that had borne the brunt of the fighting in Algeria, the lieutenants were to be found working upon the captains, and captains upon the majors and colonels — though the colonels needed little enough pressurising. As in May 1958 and January 1960, it was they, not the generals, who provided the true dynamos of revolt. Insouciantly little emphasis was placed on the views of the rank and file. There were good enough reasons of security for this omission; it was later to prove, however, the Achilles’ heel of the whole movement. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1333 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: After December 1960 the army, not the pieds noirs, drove events in Algeria; Middle-ranking colonels, not generals, drove the army revolts of 1958-1961 — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1333

Related

• Middle-ranking colonels, not generals, drove the army revolts of 1958-1961 (similarity 0.91)
• Junior officers, not generals, supplied the driving energy of army revolts (similarity 0.87)
• After December 1960 the army, not the pieds noirs, drove events in Algeria (similarity 0.83)
• The Algerian war’s decisive turning point came from the pieds noirs, not the FLN. (similarity 0.79)
• The pieds noirs, not Muslims, triggered the events sealing Algérie française’s fate (similarity 0.79)
• Army officers saw the Algerian war as both career security and a noble cause. (similarity 0.79)
• The failed December 1960 coup irrevocably committed part of the French army to revolt (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• After December 1960 the army, not the pieds noirs, drove events in Algeria #corroborates (0.90)
• Middle-ranking colonels, not generals, drove the army revolts of 1958-1961 #qualifies (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1333