The 2008 crisis was systemic, not caused by state spending or individual morality

Evidence

Note once again how none of this has anything to do with the state’s spending habits or individual morality. The causes are once again systemic and arise out of the interaction of the parts to produce an outcome that is irreducible to them. Why would people have such faith in a technology that hides risk rather than measures it? To answer that question, we need to address the deepest cause of the crisis—the other reason no one saw it coming: the theories of a generation of economic thinkers who only ever saw markets as good and the state as bad, which takes us back to economics as a morality tale, albeit of a different type. — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 118

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘economics as a morality tale’ frame is the book’s throughline and will connect directly to the austerity chapters and to Mattei. — connects to: The 2008 crisis was generated by the private sector but paid for publicly — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 75; The 2008 crisis was nonlinear and multicausal, leaving it overexplained and overdetermined — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 74; The 2008 crisis flowed from incentive structures, not individual moral failure — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 73 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• The 2008 crisis was fundamentally private-sector, not state profligacy. #corroborates (0.95) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 86
• Fire-sale contagion, not state spending, drove the 2008 liquidity collapse. #corroborates (0.90) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 85