The 2008 crisis flowed from incentive structures, not individual moral failure

Evidence

While this story satisfies some, the moral failings of individuals are irrelevant for understanding both why the financial crisis in the United States happened and why austerity is now perceived as the only possible response, especially in Europe. However, you could have replaced all the actual bankers of 2007 with completely different individuals, and they would have behaved the same way during the meltdown: that’s what incentives do. — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 73

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Mattei and the broader austerity literature’s structural (versus moralizing) explanations of crisis; also resonates with the structuration-incentive arguments in the Milgrom law merchant passages. — connects to: The 2008 crisis was generated by the private sector but paid for publicly — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 75; The 2008 crisis was systemic, not caused by state spending or individual morality — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 118; The 2008 crisis originated in private-sector practices, not state spending — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 76 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• The 2008 crisis was systemic, not caused by state spending or individual morality #corroborates (0.95) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 118
• The 2008 crisis originated in private-sector practices, not state spending #expands (0.90) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 76
• The 2008 crisis was fundamentally private-sector, not state profligacy. #corroborates (0.90) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 86
• Neoliberal crisis narratives redirect blame from structures onto individual psychology #expands (0.80) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 433
• Moral framing of recessions as punishment blocks public acceptance of stimulus #expands (0.75) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 562
• Blame for the 2008 crisis was displaced from banks onto borrowers #corroborates (0.75)