Strong secular rule of law sustains trust and cooperation without religion

Evidence

Moreover, there is another, secular route toward nice behavior: effective institutions that encourage cooperation and high levels of trust. Atheists as well as theists who are socialized in such secular societies have powerful incentives to be prosocial that are not immediately motivated by religion. Where there are strong institutions that govern public life—that is, where people are reassured that contracts are enforced, competition is fair, and cheaters will be punished—levels of trust and cooperation are high for everyone, believers and nonbelievers alike. And it appears that believers who do live in such secular societies with strong rule of law (see chapter 5) are influenced by this fact, and for them the idea that religion is necessary for morality is not as compelling. As a result, they are not as driven to distrust atheists. — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 250

Categorization

Category: Causal Relationships

• XREF: Directly connects to the analytical frame on Big God mechanisms — this is the key rival/alternative to religious monitoring that the Chambon/fumi-e analysis must account for.

Related

• Strong secular institutions raise trust and cooperation for believers and nonbelievers alike (similarity 0.96)
• Strong secular institutions reduce believers’ need to distrust atheists (similarity 0.87)
• Secular rule of law substitutes for religious monitoring of believers (similarity 0.87)
• Secular institutions substitute for supernatural monitoring by enabling trust in strangers. (similarity 0.86)
• Secular institutions and watchful gods are interchangeable in enforcing cooperation and trust (similarity 0.85)
• Secular institutions substitute for Big Gods by enforcing stranger cooperation (similarity 0.85)
• Religious belief withers when governments provide the cooperation religion once supplied. (similarity 0.84)
• Secular rule of law independently reduces believers’ distrust of atheists (similarity 0.84)
• Strong secular institutions substitute for and undermine belief in God (similarity 0.84)
• Gods and governments may be interchangeable enforcers of cooperation (similarity 0.83)
• Effective secular monitoring can erode the root cause of atheist distrust. (similarity 0.83)
• Secular institutions can replace religion’s community-building and cooperation functions (similarity 0.83)
• Secular institutions may reduce believers’ distrust of atheists by substituting for divine monitoring (similarity 0.82)
• Religious prosocial effects are muted where secular institutions already generate trust. (similarity 0.82)
• Distinct pathways to atheism reinforce one another in real populations (similarity 0.81)