Stereotypes cohere through intuitive theories, not shared attributes

Evidence

For example, social stereotypes often ascribe a wide array of attributes to the members of some target group, even when these specific attributes would not normally be classified together on the basis of semantic meaning, frequency of co-occurrence, or even shared valence. Historically, African Americans were said to be lazy, religious, unintelligent, and musical (e.g., Katz & Braly, 1933). These attributes do not normally ā€œgo together,ā€ either in people’s actual behavioral patterns or in their implicit personality theories. As a cluster of beliefs, they would have no meaning for the stereotype holder if it were not for an intuitive theory that ties them together (e.g., Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1383

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Clarifies the mechanism by which seemingly contradictory stereotype traits (lazy but religious, unintelligent but musical) cohere for the holder.
  • XREF: Connects to the reader’s interest in how beliefs justify social hierarchy — complements the earlier notes on group-justifying narratives in the sacrifice/hierarchy material. — connects to: Humans infer unseen traits of new species from essentialized hierarchical categories. — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture…, 267; the MOC ā€œThe Wound of the Label: When Knowing Someone Becomes a Way of Erasing Themā€; the MOC ā€œThe False Compass: How Racial Categories Reorder Bodies, Minds, and the Selfā€
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 1383