Stereotypes cohere through intuitive theories, not shared attributes
Evidence
For example, social stereotypes often ascribe a wide array of attributes to the members of some target group, even when these speciļ¬c attributes would not normally be classiļ¬ed together on the basis of semantic meaning, frequency of co-occurrence, or even shared valence. Historically, African Americans were said to be lazy, religious, unintelligent, and musical (e.g., Katz & Braly, 1933). These attributes do not normally āgo together,ā either in peopleās actual behavioral patterns or in their implicit personality theories. As a cluster of beliefs, they would have no meaning for the stereotype holder if it were not for an intuitive theory that ties them together (e.g., Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990). ā John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1383
Categorization
- DEFINE: Clarifies the mechanism by which seemingly contradictory stereotype traits (lazy but religious, unintelligent but musical) cohere for the holder.
- XREF: Connects to the readerās interest in how beliefs justify social hierarchy ā complements the earlier notes on group-justifying narratives in the sacrifice/hierarchy material. ā connects to: Humans infer unseen traits of new species from essentialized hierarchical categories. ā Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success: How Cultureā¦, 267; the MOC āThe Wound of the Label: When Knowing Someone Becomes a Way of Erasing Themā; the MOC āThe False Compass: How Racial Categories Reorder Bodies, Minds, and the Selfā
- corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim ā John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Yearsā¦, 1383