Small proportionate sanctions earn more credibility than dramatic all-or-nothing ones

Evidence

In foreign aid programs the overt act of terminating assistance may be so obviously painful to both sides as not to be taken seriously by the recipient, but if each small misuse of funds is to be accompanied by a small reduction in assistance, never so large as to leave the recipient helpless nor to provoke a diplomatic breach, the willingness to carry it out will receive more credulity; or if it does not at first, a few lessons may be persuasive without too much damage. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 108

Categorization

• XREF: Incremental sanctioning matches how a protection racket calibrates escalating costs against a defiant client. — connects to: Sanctions in credit markets scale proportionally with the amount of debt; Slowly escalating punishments prove more credible than sudden fatal threats — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 111; A deterrent threat is only too large when its size damages credibility — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 711 (+2 more)

Related

• Sanctions in credit markets scale proportionally with the amount of debt (similarity 0.88)

Broader Connections

• Threats gain credibility by decomposing into a series of smaller demonstrated steps #expands (0.92) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 107
• A deterrent threat is only too large when its size damages credibility #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 711