Sanctions in credit markets scale proportionally with the amount of debt

Evidence

In foreign aid programs the overt act of terminating assistance may be so obviously painful to both sides as not to be taken seriously by the recipient, but if each small misuse of funds is to be accompanied by a small reduction in assistance, never so large as to leave the recipient helpless nor to provoke a diplomatic breach, the willingness to carry it out will receive more credulity; or if it does not at first, a few lessons may be persuasive without too much damage. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 108 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Small proportionate sanctions earn more credibility than dramatic all-or-nothing ones — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 108; The diamond trade’s production cycle structurally requires credit. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 113

Related

• Small proportionate sanctions earn more credibility than dramatic all-or-nothing ones (similarity 0.88)

Broader Connections

• Small proportionate sanctions earn more credibility than dramatic all-or-nothing ones #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 108