Single-subject clauses served open government but mainly armed judges

Evidence

The clause was by no means senseless. It was, as Thomas Cooley explained, first to prevent hodge-​podge, or “log-​rolling” legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and third, to fairly apprise the people … of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the opportunity of being heard thereon. Whether the clause actually had these effects is another question. It did give the judiciary another tool to hack away at legislation. It was general enough that you could invoke it against almost any statute. In most instances, courts had no trouble upholding statutes attacked on the basis of this clause. But the power was there; it had to be reckoned with. Litigants could use the clause, in hopes of delaying, thwarting, possibly even defeating legislation. Courts, too, could themselves use the clause, to get at real abuses in the legislative process. But they could also use it as a device for whatever policy ends they favored. — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2083

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Courts and Congress responded to agency capture with standing doctrines and open-government laws — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 588; Technical state constitutional clauses gave state courts their main striking tools — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2077; The single-subject clause has voided dozens of state statutes — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2078 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• The single-subject clause has voided dozens of state statutes #expands (0.85) — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2078
• Judicial discretion is channeled by constraints, not eliminated. #complicates (0.72) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 188