Semantic analysis of definitions alone cannot justify a social-science concept.

Evidence

In short, I propose a causal, ontological, and realist view of concepts. It is an ontological view because it focuses on what constitutes a phe­ nomenon. It is causal because it identifies ontological attributes that play a key role in causal hypotheses, explanations, and mechanisms. It is realist because it involves an empirical analysis of the phenomenon. My approach stresses that concept analysis involves ascertaining the constitutive characteristics of a phenomenon that have central causal powers. These causal powers and their related causal mechanisms play a role in our theories. A purely semantic analysis of concepts, words, and their definitions is never adequate by itself A core theme running throughout this volume is that the structure of concepts is crucial. — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts, 34

Categorization

• SEED: Article angle: ‘Defining Things Won’t Save You’ — why political and social analysis stalls when it settles arguments by dictionary instead of by causal role.
• APHORISMS: Reads as methodological advice for a life of inquiry: don’t stop at the meaning of words when the question is what makes a thing work.
• XREF: Resonates with the existing kept claim that classification systems are infrastructures with political consequences — deciding a category’s boundaries is itself causal work.