Concept formation is an ontological claim about what matters, not mere definition.

Evidence

Sartori developed a semantic and definitional approach to concepts. In contrast, my approach is ontological, realist, and causal. The core attributes of a concept constitute a theory of the ontology of the phenomenon under consideration. Concepts are about ontology. To develop a concept is more than providing a definition: it is deciding what is important about an entity. The arguments about why attribute X is important form part of the ontological theory of the object. — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts, 191

Categorization

• DEFINE: Draws the line between Sartori’s semantic-definitional approach to concepts and Goertz’s ontological, realist, causal one — a framework distinction worth keeping straight when reading any concept-formation literature.
• XREF: Connects to earlier edited-volume material on how concept attributes encode causal theories, and to any work arguing that classification is never neutral (e.g. the AI-training-as-infrastructure claims).