Self-consciousness only becomes truth through the Other’s recognition

Evidence

If now instead of observing the rules of chronological succession, we are guided by those of a sort of non-temporal dialectic, we shall find that in the solution which Hegel gives to the problem in the first volume of The Phenomenology of Mind, he has made significant progress over Husserl. Here the appearance of the Other is indispensable not to the constitution of the world and of my empirical “Ego” but to the very existence of my consciousness as self-consciousness. In fact as self-consciousness, the Self itself apprehends itself. The equation “Myself = myself” or “I am I” is precisely the expression of this fact. At first this self-consciousness is pure self-identity, pure existence for itself. It has certitude of itself, but this certitude still lacks truth. In fact this certitude would be true only to the extent that its own existence for itself appeared to it as an independent object. Thus self-consciousness is first a syncretic relation without truth between a subject and an object, an object, which is not yet objectified and which is this subject himself. Since the impulse of this consciousness is to realize its concept by becoming conscious of itself in all respects, it tends to make itself valid externally by giving itself objectivity and manifest existence. It is concerned with making the “I am I” explicit and producing itself as an object in order to attain the ultimate stage of development. This state in another sense is naturally the prime mover for the becoming of consciousness; it is self-consciousness in general, which is recognized in other self-consciousnesses and which is identical with them and with itself. The mediator is the Other. The Other appears along with myself since self-consciousness is identical with itself by means of the exclusion of every Other. Thus the primary fact is the plurality of consciousnesses, and this plurality is realized in the form of a double, reciprocal relation of exclusion. Here we are then in the presence of that connection by means of an internal negation which was demanded earlier. No external nothingness in-itself separates my consciousness from the Other’s consciousness; it is by the very fact of being me that I exclude the Other. The Other is the one who excludes me by being himself, the one whom I exclude by being myself. Consciousnesses are directly supported by one another in a reciprocal imbrication of their being. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 683

The problem of the Other should not be posited in terms of the cogito; on the contrary, the existence of the Other renders the cogito possible as the abstract moment when the self is apprehended as an object. Thus the “moment” which Hegel calls being for the Other is a necessary stage of the development of self-consciousness; the road of interiority passes through the Other. But the Other is of interest to me only to the extent that he is another Me, a Me-object for Me, and conversely to the extent that he reflects my Me—i.e., is, in so far as I am an object for him. Due to the fact that I must necessarily be an object for myself only over there in the Other, I must obtain from the Other the recognition of my being. But if another consciousness must mediate between my consciousness for itself and itself, then the being-for-itself of my consciousness—and consequently its being in general—depends on the Other. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 684

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the internal negation that joins consciousnesses — the Other excluded by my very being-me, not by any external nothingness.
• XREF: Directly sets up Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity; the Hegelian master-slave dialectic in chapter 3’s ‘The Look’ follows. — connects to: Self-consciousness depends on being recognized by another consciousness; Self-certainty requires recognition from the other; Recognition given without struggle never constitutes genuine self-consciousness — Frantz Fanon, Constance Farrington, Black skin, white masks, 788 (+3 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 683; Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 684

Broader Connections

• Self-consciousness depends on being recognized by another consciousness #corroborates (0.95)
• Self-certainty requires recognition from the other #corroborates (0.90)
• Mutual recognition establishes a symmetrical dependence between self and Other #expands (0.85)
• Recognition given without struggle never constitutes genuine self-consciousness #qualifies (0.80) — Frantz Fanon, Constance Farrington, Black skin, white masks, 788
• The lover’s self-presentation demands the Other’s free recognition to succeed #exemplifies (0.80)
• Body knowledge becomes cognitive only through the gaze of the Other. #exemplifies (0.75)