Self-consciousness extends the cogito beyond the instant into one’s global project

Evidence

We have remarked sufficiently—in particular in the chapter concerning Temporality—that the Cartesian cogito must be extended. In fact, as we have seen, to assume self-consciousness never means to assume a consciousness of the instant; for the instant is only one view of the mind and even if it existed, a consciousness which would apprehend itself in the instant would no longer apprehend anything. I can assume consciousness of myself only as a particular man engaged in this or that enterprise, anticipating this or that success, fearing this or that result, and by means of the ensemble of these anticipations, outlining his whole figure. Indeed it is thus that I am apprehending myself at this moment when I am writing; I am not the simple perceptive consciousness of my hand which is making marks on the paper. I am well in advance of this hand all the way to the completion of the book and to the meaning of this book—and of philosophical activity in general—in my life. … It is within the compass of this project (i.e., within the compass of what I am) that there are inserted certain projects toward more restricted possibilities such as that of presenting this or that idea in this or that way or of ceasing to write for a moment or of paging through a volume in which I am looking for this or that reference, etc. Nevertheless it would be an error to believe that there is an analytical and differentiated consciousness corresponding to this global choice. My ultimate and initial project—for these are but one—is, as we shall see, always the outline of a solution of the problem of being. But this solution is not first conceived and then realized; we are this solution. We make it exist by means of our very engagement, and therefore we shall be able to apprehend it only by living it. Thus we are always wholly present to ourselves; but precisely because we are wholly present, we can not hope to have an analytical and detailed consciousness of what we are. Moreover this consciousness can be only non-thetic. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1117

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the ultimate/initial project as the non-thetic outline of being’s problem which we are, not something we analyze.
• XREF: Directly sets up Beauvoir’s reading of situated freedom; the project as the whole of what one is prefigures ‘ambiguity’ ethics. — connects to: Being conscious of one’s motives already places them outside the self — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1075; Self-consciousness no longer functions as an adequate foundation for thought; Individual passions are surface expressions of one total fundamental project — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1147
• DEEPTHINKING: The claim that the solution to being’s problem is not conceived then realized but ‘we are this solution,’ apprehensible only by living it, is a dense, paradigm-shifting statement.

Broader Connections

• Self-consciousness no longer functions as an adequate foundation for thought #contradicts (0.80)
• Being conscious of one’s motives already places them outside the self #expands (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1075