Science produces truth through competitive reputation incentives, not pure altruism.

Evidence

Now consider science and scientists, on whose motivations there has not been extensive research—scientists themselves often argue that their motivation is simply to seek the truth (see further Hardin 1999b). This is too romantic and ethereal a rationale for most real scientists. An individual scientist who wants support for her research and promotion for her achievements depends on a reputation for good work, work that can often be checked by others who would be happy to second-guess and correct her findings if they seem to be wrong. There is an internal competition in the enterprise of science that forces all to adhere to certain practices, such as reporting data truthfully. This competition works for truth even when the personal motivation of a scientist is not the pure search for truth. Of course, under duress, the norms of good practice may be overridden, and a scientist might fabricate data. Indeed, if the background norm is one of relatively trustworthy people in particular roles, the untrustworthy can take parasitic advantage of that background expectation. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 853

Categorization

• XREF: Extends Hardin’s core claim—trust underwritten by observable constraints on opportunistic behavior—to science: reputation and checking are the observable constraints here, paralleling Milgrom’s law-merchant reputation mechanisms. — connects to: Technical performativity now shapes what counts as scientific truth. — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on…, 344
• SEED: Article angle: ‘science as an incentive-compatible reputation market’—competition produces truth even when motivations are venal, with the parasitic-fraud caveat as the design flaw.