Sartrean freedom is primal and unmediated unlike Beauvoir’s dialectical consciousness

Evidence

Furthermore, in contradistinction to Hegel’s description of a human consciousness, which has to fi ght to establish its autonomy and the truth of its existence, for Sartre the essential freedom of consciousness is already a given. Unlike Beauvoir’s “Hegelian” model of consciousness in She Came to Stay, Sartrean consciousness is not dialectically mediated. It originates in the autonomy of the pre-refl ective cogito. Th is is a long-held view, fi rst analyzed in his early essay on Husserlian phenomenology, Th e Transcendence of the Ego— a view that he appears to cling to stubbornly throughout the text of Being and Nothingness and beyond. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 250

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Fixes the precise contrast between Sartre’s pre-reflective cogito autonomy and Beauvoir’s dialectically mediated consciousness.
  • XREF: Connects to the broader Beauvoir-Sartre authorship debate and to The Transcendence of the Ego as an early fixed position. — connects to: Sartrean freedom requires facticity, not its absence — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist CafĂ©: Freedom,…, 508; Sartre ultimately abandoned his early doctrine of absolute freedom — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 173; Beauvoir’s ethical freedom departs from Sartre’s ontological freedom to make morality possible — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 610 (+4 more)

Broader Connections