Sartre ultimately abandoned his early doctrine of absolute freedom

Evidence

Sartre, however, waits nearly another three hundred pages to make this clear. Only in Part IV does Sartre recognize “a truth of great importance,” namely, “keeping ourselves within the compass of existence-for-itself, that only my freedom can limit my freedom, we see now, when we include the Other’s existence in our considerations, that my freedom on this new level fi nds its limits also in the existence of the Other’s freedom” (BN, 525; EN, 608). Rarely noted by other commentators, Sartre abandons his initially exaggerated view of absolute freedom: freedom is not limited only by itself; it is also limited by Others. While existence precedes essence, the social world precedes individual existences; thus, when Sartre considers the fact that sociality precedes and modifi es existence, he argues for social limitations to freedom. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 173

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the long-standing Beauvoir-as-moral-source vs. Sartre-as-ontologist historiography; the passage argues Beauvoir’s interdependent-freedoms ethic does NOT depart from Sartre’s considered view. — connects to: Sartre repeatedly failed to finish grand philosophical conclusions — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 528; The war drove Sartre from individualist freedom toward Marxist social determinism — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 525; Sartre’s late thought shifted from individual freedom toward political commitment — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 853 (+8 more)
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: whether later Sartre scholars have absorbed this revision of the standard ‘Beauvoir the ethicist departed from Sartre’ narrative.

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir’s situated account of freedom moved Sartre beyond his earlier absolutism #corroborates (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 46
• Sartre had already rejected absolute freedom before Beauvoir wrote Pyrrhus and Cinéas #corroborates (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 175
• Sartre’s keyhole example contradicted his own earlier claim that only freedom limits freedom #corroborates (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 169
• Sartrean freedom is primal and unmediated unlike Beauvoir’s dialectical consciousness #contradicts (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 250
• Sartre’s analysis of freedom is fragmented and internally inconsistent across Being and Nothingness #exemplifies (0.75) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 212
• Sartrean freedom requires facticity, not its absence #complicates (0.75) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 508