Sartre replaces universal human nature with a universal human condition of shared limitations.

Evidence

Furthermore, although it is impossible to find in each and every man a universal essence that can be called human nature, there is nevertheless a human universality of condition. It is not by chance that the thinkers of today are so much more ready to speak of the condition than of the nature of man. By his condition they understand, with more or less clarity, all the limitations which a priori define man’s fundamental situation in the universe. His historical situations are variable: man may be born a slave in a pagan society or may be a feudal baron, or a proletarian. But what never vary are the necessities of being in the world, of having to labor and to die there. These limitations are neither subjective nor objective, or rather there is both a subjective and an objective aspect of them. Objective, because we meet with them everywhere and they are everywhere recognisable: and subjective because they are lived and are nothing if man does not live them – if, that is to say, he does not freely determine himself and his existence in relation to them. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism, 23

Categorization

  • DEFINE: This is the core Sartrean definition of ‘condition’ (distinct from nature) that frame the rest of the essay.
  • XREF: Pairs directly with Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity, which builds her whole project on this condition-vs-nature distinction. — connects to: Sartre held every act creates an image of humanity we ought to be; Sartre held that individual lives are infinite and therefore incomparable in value. — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 774

Broader Connections