Sartre and Merleau-Ponty both grounded perception in affective rather than theoretical objects

Evidence

On the basis of Husserl’s concepts and distinctions, French phenomenologists Sartre as well as Merleau-Ponty developed an argument to the eff ect that the original objects of our experience are not theoretical objects but aff ective things that move, attract, and repulse us (e.g., EN, 649–51; BN, 769–71; DS II, 155; SS, 399). We do not see a table, for example, as a structure of wood fi bers, cells, or molecules. Th e perceived table is not a theoretical object of natural sciences. Rather, we see the table as a practical object of everyday aff airs and primarily as an attractive thing that invites our bodies to move in certain ways: we slide our hand on its smooth, cool surface as if it “demanded those movements of convergence that will endow it with its ‘true’ aspect,” as Merleau-Ponty writes. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 357

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to the book’s core question of Beauvoir–Sartre influence: the shared Husserlian inheritance both drew on, with page citations from L’Être et le Néant and Being and Nothingness. — connects to: Merleau-Ponty pioneered embodied cognition by centering the body and perception in philosophy — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 1026; Affectivity is inseparable from materiality in Sartrean perception — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 358; Husserl reconciled affective perception with transcendental constitution by positing two levels of activity — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 354

Broader Connections

• Affectivity is inseparable from materiality in Sartrean perception #corroborates (0.90) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 358
• Husserl reconciled affective perception with transcendental constitution by positing two levels of activity #qualifies (0.72) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 354