Sartre’s keyhole example contradicted his own earlier claim that only freedom limits freedom

Evidence

Caught in the act of surreptitiously spying through a keyhole, Sartre argues for the astonishing claim that the objectifying gaze of the Other “aff ects my being” and causes “essential modifi cations [to] appear in my structure” (BN, 260; EN, 318). Th e claim is “astonishing” since, to this point in Being and Nothingness, my “being” has been considered totally unaff ected by anything except my consciousness. In the preface to Being and Nothingness, Sartre argues that consciousness is limited only by itself (BN, lv; EN, 22; see also TE, 38), which entails that “only my freedom can limit my freedom.” So understood, absolute freedom is the view that freedom has no limits other than those imposed upon itself— a view diffi cult to take seriously. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 169

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines ‘absolute freedom’ as the view that freedom has no limits except those it imposes on itself.
• XREF: connects to: Sartrean freedom requires facticity, not its absence — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 508; Sartre ultimately abandoned his early doctrine of absolute freedom — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 173; Sartre’s analysis of freedom is fragmented and internally inconsistent across Being and Nothingness — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 212

Broader Connections

• Sartre’s analysis of freedom is fragmented and internally inconsistent across Being and Nothingness #corroborates (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 212