Sartre’s freedom model subordinates others while Beauvoir’s requires affirming their freedom

Evidence

While both thinkers articulate a primary dependency relationship between myself and the Other, I will argue that Sartre ends up with a disjunctive tension between freedom and the Other insofar as affi rming one’s own freedom seems almost necessarily to involve a subordination of the freedom of the Other, whereas for Beauvoir, my own freedom can only be realized if I simultaneously affi rm the freedom of the Other. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 633

Categorization

• SEED: The sharper historiographical claim here: Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity (1947) functions as an implicit corrective to Being and Nothingness (1943), not a mere companion piece. A useful essay angle on how critics misread the chronology of influence.
• XREF: connects to: Sartre reframed freedom as a demand for responsibility born of nuclear-age self-knowledge — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 41; Beauvoir’s interdependence thesis is compatible with her irrepressible freedom — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 182; Beauvoir’s moral arguments for willing others’ freedom predate Sartre’s — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 578 (+9 more)

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir’s early ethics treats freedom as necessarily directed toward others #corroborates (0.90) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 76
• Beauvoir holds Others as essential, challenging Sartre’s ontological individualism #expands (0.88) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 184
• Beauvoir’s ontological freedom position may not depart significantly from Sartre’s #contradicts (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 212
• Beauvoir’s ethical freedom departs from Sartre’s ontological freedom to make morality possible #expands (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 610
• Beauvoir diverges from Sartre by excusing the oppressed from willing freedom #complicates (0.82) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 650
• Beauvoir’s situated account of freedom moved Sartre beyond his earlier absolutism #expands (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 46
• Beauvoir’s interdependence ethic overlaps with Sartre’s own considered view #contradicts (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 173