Rule-of-reason antitrust adjudication is so arbitrary it rarely catches monopolists.

Evidence

Simons called for the courts to spurn the rule of reason because “[when] lawyers try to draw a line between lawful and unlawful restraint of trade, they invariably end up with something that looks like the silhouette of a roller-coaster… . The purpose may be laudable; but the result is that few people get caught, rather fortuitously, and the growth of monopoly, with perhaps some formal modification, proceeds apace” (101). — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1194

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s earlier material on the Chicago School’s antitrust skepticism and critique of vague legal standards. — connects to: Antitrust law alone was seen as insufficient against corporate concentration of power. — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 1093; Antitrust law’s presumptions cannot be isolated from prevailing economic theory — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 1146; Post-1911 antitrust law turned against ordinary practices without requiring monopoly size — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 1137 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Antitrust law’s presumptions cannot be isolated from prevailing economic theory #qualifies (0.75) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1146
• Post-1911 antitrust law turned against ordinary practices without requiring monopoly size #expands (0.75) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1137
• Certainty-driven per se rules threatened antitrust’s common law flexibility #complicates (0.75) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1138