Religious switching barely affects global religious demographics.

Evidence

The Pew Research Center 2017 report indicates the minimal impact of religious switching on projected demographic changes. Most religious switching occurs from Christianity to religiously unaffiliated, with a very small amount of demographic change generated by conversion from Christianity to Islam. According to the report, “the net impact of religious switching [from 2010 to 2015] accounted for an estimated 23% of unaffiliated growth and 0.3% of Muslim growth while reducing Christian growth by 7%.” (p. 7). Overall, religious switching from 2010–15 led to a -9.0 million decrease in the number of Christians worldwide, a +0.5 increase in Muslims, and a +8.0 million increase in religiously unaffiliated. — Margaret Hodson, Baby Jihad, 32

Categorization

• XREF: Counteracts popular narratives of mass conversion to Islam driving demographic change; connects to discussions of Islamophobic demographic panics. — connects to: Religious switching had minimal impact on projected demographic changes, with conversions generating only 0.3% of Muslim growth.; White nationalists believe this increase in switching to religiously unaffiliated causes lower fertility and birth rates for Western women. William Kilpatrick writes that ‘The decline of Christianity in Europe led to a loss of cultural confidence and a loss of will. This loss of faith also translated into a declining birth rate.’ (2016, 131). As stated above, Pew Research Center (2107) confirms that religiously unaffiliated women are projected to have lower fertility rates than religiously affiliated women. However, religiosity is only one factor impacting fertility rates, and is intertwined with educational opportunities, economic development, and age of marriage amongst other factors. However, here begins a shift from internal factors within Western society to external threats. There is indeed a perceived threat from within Western society due to religious switching, secularism, and lower fertility rates. However, the threat is also viewed as externally imposed on Western society in the form of ‘baby jihad.’ As shown above, religious switching has little impact on demographic changes. Therefore, white nationalist fears of religious switching impacting demography indicate greater fears about national security and cultural values. However, there are data to support large demographic shifts due to differing fertility rates and age distributions. White nationalists view demography as a form of jihad, and thus fear these projected changes.; Specifically, I will examine recent demographic data from the Pew Templeton Global Futures project Changing Global Religious Landscape Report published in April 2017. This report outlines historical demographic data from 2010-2015 and projected trends for 2015–2060 based on religious group. Additionally, for data on migration, I’ll use the 2015 The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050 from the Pew Research Center. Within each subsection of the article, I will first present the relevant demographic data. Then, I will analyze white nationalist fears stoked by projected or historical demographic changes. It is important to note that much of the literature reviewed in this article was written before the two Pew reports were released. Only one author directly cites data from the Pew Research Center in his work about demography as jihad. However, my goal is to put demographic data and anti-Muslim views into conversation. I seek to show the linkages (or lack thereof) to better understand white nationalist fears. Overall, demographic data can provide a fuller picture of these fears. Demographic projections show massive changes in the future religious make-up of the global population. Specifically, the 2017 Pew Research Center report projects that ‘babies born to Muslims will begin to outnumber Christian births by 2035.’ In addition, the number of Muslims globally is predicted to equal the number of Christians by 2060 (p. 5). The primary factors impacting demographic changes are fertility rates, age distribution, religious switching, and migration. Fertility rates and age distribution have the largest effect on shifting demography, while religious switching and migration have much smaller effects. (+5 more)
• QUESTION: Worth verifying whether Pew’s switching data counts conversions bidirectional or only net, and whether reversion to non-religion within a single lifetime is captured.

Broader Connections

• Fertility and age structure dwarf conversion in shaping religious demographics. #corroborates (0.75) — Margaret Hodson, Baby Jihad, 34