Religious commitment functions as a trust cue where institutions are weak
Evidence
In a society where the rule of law is weak, and overall levels of trust and cooperation among strangers are quite low (that’s indeed most people for most of history), credible signals of fearing a god are, and have been, the only game in town, and in those societies, it would be reasonable to rely on such religious badges as a trust cue. I say “religious badges,” to borrow a term from Richard Sosis, because in these societies, atheism is largely absent, and therefore the only available cue is the degree of credible religious commitment. — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 254
Categorization
Category: Definitional Content
- XREF: This is the partner-choice mechanism in disguise — religious badges cheaply signal cooperator type, exactly inverse to the fumi-e which destroys the badge’s credibility. Strongly relevant to reader’s analytical thread.
- DEFINE: ‘Religious badges’ defined as the only available trust cue in low-institution societies where atheism is absent.
Related
- Fear of god functioned historically as the sole trust mechanism among strangers (similarity 0.88)
- Observable religious commitment signals produce trust among believers (similarity 0.80)
- Religious similarity serves as a trust cue that excludes atheists (similarity 0.80)
- Strong secular institutions raise trust and cooperation for believers and nonbelievers alike (similarity 0.79)
- Religious trust extends to any outgroup holding supernatural sanctioning beliefs (similarity 0.79)
- Secular institutions and watchful gods are interchangeable in enforcing cooperation and trust (similarity 0.78)
- Religious cues harness situational power where secular institutions are absent (similarity 0.78)
- Religious prosocial effects are muted where secular institutions already generate trust. (similarity 0.78)
- Strong secular rule of law sustains trust and cooperation without religion (similarity 0.78)
- Strangers perceived as religious are trusted with more money (similarity 0.78)