Religion’s representation of spirit differs fundamentally from art’s figurative imaging

Evidence

Representation, thus, first appears as a process which temporalizes the conceptual content. The concept’s logical moments would appear as chronological moments. Such a linear temporalization is echoed by a movement of spatialization. Indeed, representation separates (trennt) the speculative moments by juxtaposing them to each other, by solidifying the elements which form the living whole of the concept endowing them with an autonomous existence. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 661 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Between the three moments of absolute spirit – art, religion and philosophy – the difference is not of content but of form, and this has two consequences. First, the spiritual in-formation, the labour in which speculative content gives itself its form, does not have the same nature or the same outcome in all three moments. To this extent, as a second consequence, the relationship enjoyed by spirit or by individual consciousness to these modalities of ‘in-formation’ is no longer uniform, and in its turn is differentiated into figuration, representation, and conceptual thought. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 944 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Spirit presents itself differently in nature, art, religion, and philosophy; Religious representation distorts the concept by temporalizing and spatializing it — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 661; Art, religion, and philosophy differ only in form, not content — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 944

Broader Connections

• Religious representation distorts the concept by temporalizing and spatializing it #corroborates (0.85) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 661
• Art, religion, and philosophy differ only in form, not content #contradicts (0.75) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 944