Alternative institutional arrangements can substitute for one another to produce the same outcome

Evidence

At the secondary level, Ostrom identifies variables that are specific means of sanctioning and monitoring, thereby employing a substitutable relationship between levels. She describes two ways that monitoring can be accomplished, monitoring by an institutional member or monitoring by a paid agent. … Analogously, the basic-level cause of sanctions can be arrived at in one of two ways, sanctions by institutional officials or sanctions by paid police. Again, the relationship here is one equifinality: institutional-official sanctions or paid-police sanctions are alternative paths to sanctions in general. — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts, 1657

Categorization

  • XREF: Equifinality here connects to Ostrom’s own commons work and to the ā€˜many paths to the same outcome’ logic seen elsewhere. — connects to: In cultural study, arbitrariness means another choice could serve equally. — W. David Marx, Status and Culture: How Our Desire for…, 115; Conventions are arbitrary practices that coordinate choices where several options are equally viable — W. David Marx, Status and Culture: How Our Desire for…, 119; Regimes with capital substitute purchase for direct coercion of subjects — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 129
  • SEED: Angle: ā€˜Equifinality is why one-size-fits-all institutional prescriptions fail’ — monitoring by neighbors versus paid agents as the paradigm case.