Refusal to take a stance on one’s identity is itself a stance.

Evidence

Although I have at my disposal an infinity of ways of assuming my being-for-others, I am not able not to assume it. We find here again that condemnation to freedom which we defined above as facticity. I can neither abstain totally in relation to what I am (for the Other)—for to refuse is not to abstain but still to assume—nor can I submit to it passively (which in a sense amounts to the same thing). Whether in fury, hate, pride, shame, disheartened refusal or joyous demand, it is necessary for me to choose to be what I am. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1238

Categorization

• APHORISMS: ‘To refuse is not to abstain but still to assume’ — a compact lesson in how inaction is action, worth returning to.
• XREF: Connects to the earlier ‘condemnation to freedom’ / facticity definition, and to Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity. — connects to: Political stances must be judged by whether they stand alone or answer other forces — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 692; The refusal to choose is itself a choice. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism, 26; Opposing fashion is itself a form of conforming — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 728 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• The refusal to choose is itself a choice. #corroborates (0.92) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism, 26
• Authentic refusal rejects the terms of the question itself. #expands (0.82) — Jenny Odell, How to Do Nothing, 332
• Opposing fashion is itself a form of conforming #corroborates (0.78) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 728
• Political stances must be judged by whether they stand alone or answer other forces #corroborates (0.72) — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 692