Reform agencies muted criticism once their friends held power and shared patronage

Evidence

In New York City, the fading of idealism on the municipal level had been especially rapid. With reform enthroned in City Hall, not all reformers stayed reformers. Before Mitchel’s election, the policy of the Bureau of Municipal Research had been to investigate city government no matter who was running it, but after his election, Cleveland announced, “When its friends are in power, a citizen research agency should not publish unfavorable information.” The city’s Good Government organizations had become much less active. One reason was that they did not want to hurt what they considered the city’s last, best chance against Tammany. But there was also another reason. As Allen himself put it: “One reason for this conspiracy of silent criticism and public applause cannot be too baldly stated or too vividly remembered, namely, almost every agency of outside criticism ‘had its feet in the trough’—to use a conventionalized term for sharing in political patronage.” — Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker, 362

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Reformers excused Moses’ abuses until he turned them on themselves — Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the…, 2839; Critics of institutional complicity are dismissed as bullies and dissidents rather than engaged — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 2379; Quiet private leverage outperformed public denunciation in achieving reform — Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the…, 395 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Critics of institutional complicity are dismissed as bullies and dissidents rather than engaged #complicates (0.75) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 2379
• Quiet private leverage outperformed public denunciation in achieving reform #complicates (0.70) — Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker, 395