Rawls’s political consensus is positioned as beyond legitimate contestation once reached

Evidence

Rawls seems to believe that whereas rational agreement among comprehensive moral religious and philosophical doctrine is impossible, in the political domain such an agreement can be reached. Once the controversial doctrines have been relegated to the sphere of the private, it is possible, in his view. to establish in the public sphere a type of consensus grounded on Reason (with its two sides: the rational and the reasonable). This is a consensus that it would be illegitimate to put into question once it has been reached. and the only possibility of destabilization would be an attack from the outside by the ‘unreasonable’ forces. This implies that when a well-ordered society has been achieved, those who take part in the overlapping consensus should have no right to question the existing arrangements, since they embody the principles of justice. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 126

Categorization

• QUESTION: This is the key move Mouffe will attack: a consensus immunized against internal questioning. Follow whether her critique turns on this very point.
• XREF: Connects to agonistic pluralism’s debate with deliberative democracy and to critiques of ‘end of ideology’ depoliticization. — connects to: Rawls’s well-ordered society erases the adversary and expels legitimate opposition from the public sphere — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 69; Rawls frames political liberalism as securing stability among reasonable pluralists — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 107; Rawls’s well-ordered society eliminates politics and requires coercion of dissenters — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 129 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Rawls’s well-ordered society erases the adversary from democratic politics. #expands (0.88) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 69
• Rawls’s well-ordered society eliminates politics and requires coercion of dissenters #expands (0.86) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 129
• Contestation, not collective will, legitimately constrains discretionary power. #contradicts (0.82) — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 59
• Democratic politics should mobilize passions, not eliminate them for rational consensus #contradicts (0.80) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 462
• Neoliberal meetings expected contestation rather than consensus #complicates (0.72) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 371