Racial attitudes reduce to a felt sense of group position

Evidence

Blumer’s observation (1958a) that racial attitudes involve a sense of group position provides the most direct starting point for the present argument. Blumer suggested that racial attitudes consist of a feeling of in-group superiority, a sense of a proprietary claim to certain resources, and a sense that the outgroup poses a threat to the position of the ingroup. Each of these attitudes is a social product, and taken together, they constitute a sense of group position. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3361 (#expands, via linked claim)

These clear-cut findings and contributions do not, however, firmly substantiate the main theory. Early research on symbolic racism treated prejudice as a single unitary dimension (Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979, 1980). Subsequent research has shown that racial attitudes have several reasonably distinct but correlated dimensions (Bobo, 1983). The most important of these dimensions for predicting school busing opposition is attitude toward black political activism. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3430 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Although Allport thought that the combined influence of extrafamilial pressure (e.g., peer groups, social institutions, and mass media) might sway prejudiced people’s opinions, he underestimated the power of social consensus as a force for change. Recent research suggests that changing the perception of social norms (to create consensus) can result in immediate and long-lasting changes in prejudice. Stangor, Sechrist, and Jost (2001a, 2001b) had White/European American students first indicate their beliefs about positive and negative stereotypes of African Americans, and then estimate the beliefs of fellow students at their university. One week later, they provided participants with (false) information indicating that, according to research, they had either underor over-estimated the prejudice of their peers. Because of a (bogus) “computer error,” the students were told their initial data had been lost and were asked to report their racial beliefs again. As expected, participants attitudes moved substantially in the direction of the bogus social consensus information – becoming either more positive or more negative toward African Americans depending on what the local consensus was said to be. These changes were strong and persisted for up to two weeks (Stangor et al., 2001b). … Follow-up work showed that people do not follow the social norms of just any group. Instead, it has to be a group that is meaningful to them; that is, of which they are (or aspire to be) a member, suggesting that these effects are based on conformity, rather than motivated simply by a desire to be accurate (Stangor et al., 2001b). — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1915 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Perceived racial demographic shifts cause a conservative shift in White Americans through group-status threat. — Maureen A. Craig and Jennifer A. Richeson, On the Precipice of a…, 8; Attitudes toward other minority groups were measured with averaged 100-point thermometer ratings — Chen-Bo Zhong, Adam D. Galinsky, and Miguel M. Unzueta, Negational racial identity and…, 32; Mortality salience shifts Whites’ racial-pride and discrimination judgments in favor of their own race. — Jeff Greenberg and Spee Kosloff, Terror Management Theory: Implications…, 44 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• Racial attitudes comprise a felt group position of superiority, proprietary claim, and perceived threat #expands (0.97) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3361
• Racial attitudes form several distinct dimensions rather than one unitary prejudice #complicates (0.82) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3430
• Changing perceived social consensus shifts racial prejudice strongly and persistently #complicates (0.75) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1915
• Symbolic racism may decompose into separate attitude factors rather than one coherent belief system #complicates (0.74) — Christopher Tarman and David O. Sears, The Conceptualization and Measurement…, 22
• Reported racial attitudes often diverge from actual discriminatory behavior #complicates (0.72) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2089
• Bogus peer consensus information shifts people’s reported racial attitudes #complicates (0.70) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1915