Protection prices rise with the protector’s independence from the protectee

Evidence

The price of protection was therefore higher, since the independence of the protector was greater relative to that of the protectee—so high, in fact, that Lupo refers to guardiania as a “racket.” Moreover, unlike his counterparts inland, the guardiano lived not on the estate but nearby in the city and as a deterrent relied on his reputation rather than his physical presence. By living in the city, the mafioso was free to put his reputation to a number of uses—that is, to attract a wider variety of customers—such as providing buyers with guarantees of the quality of produce — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 216

Categorization

Category: Causal Relationships

• XREF: Directly instantiates Gambetta’s core supply-demand model of protection markets — the protectee’s price depends on the protector’s independence. Also connects to Schelling’s credible commitments: the guardiano’s reputation functions as a commitment device substituting for physical presence.
• ADDENDUM: The guardiano’s reputation-as-deterrent paralleling physical presence connects to the commitment mechanics framing in the reader’s stated purpose.

Related

• Protection demand, not commodity prosperity, predicts mafia entry into a market. (similarity 0.83)
• Mafia protection is a demanded commodity substituting for trust (similarity 0.83)
• Protection supply can create its own demand rather than merely meet it. (similarity 0.81)
• Protection services can be paid in prestige rather than money (similarity 0.81)
• Protection suppliers can create demand that did not previously exist. (similarity 0.81)
• A protection firm’s reputation substitutes directly for its enforcement capacity. (similarity 0.80)
• In protection markets reputation substitutes for actual service delivery. (similarity 0.80)
• Protection is a market where mafiosi may reject customers or bestow protection as gifts. (similarity 0.80)
• Protection availability lowers criminal career entry costs (similarity 0.78)
• Mafia protection only emerges where territory can be cheaply monitored (similarity 0.78)
• Demand for protection does not guarantee supply of a mafia (similarity 0.78)
• Mafia protection requires maintaining relations with the underworld it polices (similarity 0.78)
• Buying protection against oneself signals credibility and creates a new efficient equilibrium. (similarity 0.78)
• Protection is bought as potential, regardless of whether it is ever used (similarity 0.78)