Protection availability lowers criminal career entry costs

Evidence

Ordinary citizens dislike being cheated or robbed. But something we tend to forget is that so do thieves: there is nothing like a dishonest fence to spoil their sleep. They cannot resort to the law, and, being criminals, they have an excellent reason not to trust one another. Thus, thieves need protection badly and, as a result, become particularly eager customers. Correspondingly, if protection is readily available, the temptation to embark on a criminal career increases, since it becomes easier to dispose of stolen goods or to avoid retaliation. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 84

Categorization

• XREF: Parallels the Milgrom et al. analysis: criminals lack enforceable contracts and third-party arbitration, so the mafia supplies the same private-judge function the Champagne fairs supplied for merchants.
• SEED: The ‘dishonest fence’ line is an essay seed on how illicit markets create their own demand for third-party trust institutions — the underworld as a mirror of legal trade’s contracting problems.