Prisoner’s dilemma arises when dominant incentives yield jointly worse results

Evidence

“Prisoner’s dilemma” refers, in game theory, to a configuration of payoffs that gives both players dominant incentives—in the absence of an enforceable agreement to the contrary—to choose strategies that together yield both players a less desirable outcome than if both had made opposite choices. The name derives from the problem of two prisoners, separately interrogated, who may confess to a moderate crime in common or accuse each other of a heavy crime, an accuser going free unless himself accused, the accused one or ones receiving heavy sentences. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 814

Categorization

• DEFINE: Canonical statement of the prisoner’s dilemma payoff configuration.
• XREF: connects to: One-shot strategic games can lock rational players into collectively worse outcomes.; Worsening one’s own outcomes can be strategically advantageous in mixed-motive games. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 358; Trust matters precisely because relations have prisoner’s-dilemma structure — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 908

Related

• One-shot strategic games can lock rational players into collectively worse outcomes. (similarity 0.93)
• Worsening one’s own outcomes can be strategically advantageous in mixed-motive games. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Trust matters precisely because relations have prisoner’s-dilemma structure #expands (0.82) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 908
• Worsening one’s own outcomes can be strategically advantageous in mixed-motive games. #corroborates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 358