Prior interpreters declared Hegel’s two futures irreconcilably contradictory

Evidence

Koyré, on the one hand, argues that for Hegel, ‘time is dialectical and … is constructed from the vantage point of the future’, but on the other hand, he asserts that the philosophy of history – and in that respect the philosophy of Hegel as a whole, the System, so to speak – can only be a possibility if history has come to an end, if it has no more future; if time can stop. Hegel was never able to ‘conciliate’ the two meanings that the notion of the future takes on in his System: on the one hand, a chronological future, whose dynamic is the foundation of all historical development, and, on the other hand, a future as the logical ‘happening’ of the concept, i.e. the concept in the ‘act-of-coming-to-itself (Zu-sich-selbst-kommen)’. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 213

Categorization

• QUESTION: The impasse Koyré and Kojève hit — chronological future vs. logical coming-to-itself — is exactly what Malabou claims plasticity dissolves. Worth tracking how her solution actually differs.
• XREF: Connects to Heidegger’s near-contemporaneous account of futurity (Zeitlichkeit) that Koyré and Kojève flagged. — connects to: Hegel alone achieved consciousness of contradictions within a single system

Broader Connections

• Hegel alone achieved consciousness of contradictions within a single system #corroborates (0.72)