Power cannot be defined directly but only through transferred general concepts.

Evidence

The absolute minimum of what remains, even in the view of those most hostile to Plato, is this: that we cannot express ourselves in a language composed wholly of proper names, but must have also general words such as ‘man’, ‘dog’, ‘cat’; or, if not these, then relational words such as ‘similar’, ‘before’, and so on. Such words are not meaningless noises, and it is difficult to see how they can have meaning if the world consists entirely of particular things, such as are designated by proper names. — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 587 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Endless theorizing of power can empty power of real meaning; Language requires general terms that cannot be explained purely by particulars — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 587

Broader Connections